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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 27 JUNE 1975 NUMBER 2
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
I. SOUTH CAROLINA TAX COMMISSION
In Scott v. South Carolina Tax Commission,' the South Car-
olina Supreme Court reversed a lower court's ruling that deduc-
tions from the retirement pay of a retired member of the armed
services that went to provide an annuity for his spouse were exclu-
dible from gross income for South Carolina state income tax pur-
poses as they are under federal tax regulations. While it might be
desirable to harmonize the federal and state positions, 2 action by
the General Assembly is clearly the appropriate manner in which
to adopt that position, and the court rightly refused to act in the
legislature's place.
Commander Robert Scott, the taxpayer, retired from the
Navy in 1961 after 26 years of active duty, returned home to
Edgefield County, and began receiving retirement pay. This re-
tirement pay was to continue during his lifetime and would termi-
nate only at his death. In 1953, the taxpayer made an irrevocable
election to have a certain portion of his retirement pay withheld
in order for his wife to receive a reduced sum for her life should
he predecease her. Having made that election, Scott retained no
control over the part that was withheld for his wife's annuity.
Under a 1966 federal income taxation statute, 3 Scott and his
wife were entitled to exclude from their gross income in 1966 the
sum of these reductions in retirement pay for the period 1961-66.
In 1967, they excluded the amount withheld that year. On their
South Carolina returns for these two years they made similar
deductions; the South Carolina Tax Commission, however, disal-
1. 262 S.C. 144, 202 S.E.2d 854 (1974).
2. Actually, making the two systems agree with each other simply for the sake of
conformity is probably the sole reason to make such a change at the state level. The
ordinary taxpayer, who is not a retired serviceman, is not able to deduct such contribu-
tions from income for a spouse's annuity, and it is unclear why former military personnel
should be allowed to do so. Perhaps this is merely another in the long line of benefits
Congress has provided for military retirees at the general public's expense.
3. See note 12 infra.
1
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lowed these deductions and assessed a tax on that amount. The
Scotts paid the tax under protest and brought this action to re-
cover the sum paid. The issue presented to the lower court was
whether that portion of the husband's retirement pay withheld to
provide a future benefit for his spouse and contingent upon her
surviving him, was taxable in South Carolina as gross income.
The Edgefield County Court of Common Pleas held that the
income in issue was not taxable as gross income.' The supreme
court reversed, stating, "The tax statute includes in gross income
all compensation for personal service 'of whatever kind and in
whatever form paid.' "5 Justice Bussey disagreed with the major-
ity's broad interpretation of the statute and dissented on the
ground that this was not income within the intent of the state's
income tax law because no one except Mrs. Scott could ever gain
any economic or monetary benefit from the amount by which her
husband's pay was reduced. Moreover, any benefit she might
receive was for her life only and was contingent upon her surviv-
ing her husband.'
Ordinarily, a retiring member of the armed forces is entitled
to receive retirement pay based on a computation involving years
of service and rank or grade at retirement;7 this pay continues
only for the life of the retired member. Retirees, however, may
elect to receive a reduction in their retired pay to provide an
annuity for spouse or children under the Retired Serviceman's
Family Protection Plan.
8
4. The order of Judge Frank Eppes of the 13th Judicial Circuit, Greenville, January
6, 1973, stated:
I find from the testimony that the Plaintiff, R.C. Scott, can neither recover, use
nor receive any benefit from these funds during his lifetime under the meaning
of Section 65-221, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1962) imposing a tax on the
entire net income of the individual residing in the State of South Carolina.
Further, I find that should the Plaintiff, R.C. Scott, predecease his wife, any
funds received by her will be taxable as net income to the beneficiary.
Therefore, It Is Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed, that the Plaintiffs are granted
judgment. ...
Record at 21.
5. 262 S.C. at 147, 202 S.E.2d at 855.
6. Id. at 148, 202 S.E.2d at 856 (Bussey, J., dissenting).
7. 10 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970) details the exact method of computation.
8. 10 U.S.C. § 1431 (1970) states in pertinent part that "a person . . . may elect to
receive a reduced amount of the retired pay or retainer pay to which he may become
entitled as a result of service in his armed force." The Act describes the kind of annuities
that may be elected and those persons eligible to be named as beneficiaries to receive
payments under the annuity. See 10 U.S.C. § § 1434 & 1435 (1970). The method of comput-
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Gross income is defined in the federal taxation statute as "all
income from whatever source derived. . .. " These terms, in
their simplest sense, apparently mean that income is that which
is paid to the one earning it; the concept is not so restricted. Mr.
Justice Stone stated in Helvering v. Horst:
Admittedly not all economic gain of the taxpayer is taxable
income. . . .But the decisions and regulations have consis-
tently recognized that receipt in cash or property is not the only
characteristic of realization of income to a taxpayer on the cash
receipts basis ...
.. [T]he rule that income is not taxable until realized has
never been taken to mean that the taxpayer, even on the cash
receipts basis, who has fully enjoyed the benefit of the economic
gain represented by his right to receive income, can escape taxa-
tion because he himself has not received payment of it from his
obligor. 0
The Supreme Court has construed the intention of Congress in
this area to be the taxation of all gains except those specifically
excepted." Income withheld from retired military pay for the
purpose of providing an annuity of the type involved in Scott,
however, is excluded by statute from gross income for taxation
purposes. 2 Prior to the enactment of that statute on March 8,
1966, (effective January 1, 1966) the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue had held that a retired member of the military was
subject to income taxes on his full retirement pay and that
9. 26 U.S.C. § 61 (1970).
10. 311 U.S. 112, 115-16 (1940).
11. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429-30 (1955):
But Congress applied no limitations as to the source of taxable receipts, nor
restrictive labels as to their nature. And the Court has given a liberal construc-
tion to this broad phraseology in recognition of the intention of Congress to tax
all gains except those specifically exempted.
See Factor v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 100, 129 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 933
(1961).
12. 26 U.S.C. § 122(a) (1970) states in pertinent part:
In the case of a member or former member of the uniformed services of the
United States who has made an election under chapter 73 of title 10 of the
United States Code [§ 1431] to receive a reduced amount of retired or retainer
pay, gross income does not include the amount of any reduction after December
31, 1965, in his retired or retainer pay by reason of such election.
The section was amended in 1974 to read:
In the case of a member or former member of the uniformed services of the
United States, gross income does not include the amount of any reduction in
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amounts deducted under the Retired Serviceman's Family Pro-
tection Plan, and its predecessor, the Uniformed Services Contin-
gency Option Act of 1953, were not deductible for federal income
tax purposes.1
3
Under the South Carolina taxing statute, gross income (as
appropriate here) is defined as "the income of a taxpayer derived
from salaries, wages or compensation for personal services, of
whatever kind and in whatever form paid . . . and income de-
rived from any source whatsoever."14 As in the case with federal
taxes, our court has held that exceptions from income for tax
purposes must be clearly specified.
It seems to be well established that deductions from gross in-
come are not a matter of right. They are a matter of legislative
grace, and a taxpayer claiming a deduction must bring himself
squarely within the terms of a statute expressly authorizing it.'
No provision for the exclusion of deductions under this plan from
taxable income exists in South Carolina. Because both federal
and state statutes similarly define gross income,16 it is significant
13. Rev. Rul. 54-154, 1954-1, CuM. BuLL. 15, cited in Brief for Appellant at 3. A second
ruling bearing on the issue was T.D. 5208, 1943 CuM. BuLL. 65, which noted that amounts
withheld under the Civil Service Retirement Act were to be treated as gross income for
that year since they were payments toward the purchase of annuities. Brief for Appellant
at 3,4. See Williamson v. Commissioner, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 424 (1968), which stated
that a retired member of the United States Public Health Service could not exclude from
taxable income those sums withheld from his retired pay prior to 1966 in consideration
for a survivorship annuity for his spouse:
If no provision had been made at all for an exclusion from retired pay in later
years, petitioners would still be governed by the law applicable to the years in
which income was received and required to include the amount in income. The
fact that an exclusion was allowed by Statute in later years does not cause
petitioners to be entitled to any form of relief other than that given by the
statute.
Id. at 428. This seemingly demonstrates that statutory action is required before the
amounts withheld from Scott's retirement pay can be excluded from gross income and
that without such action, the amounts withheld would be included in gross income. Since
there is no such South Carolina statute, there is no exclusion. See text accompanying note
16 infra.
14. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-251 (1962).
15. Southern Weaving Co. v. Query, 206 S.C. 307, 313-14, 34 S.E.2d 51, 54 (1945),
quoting Hales-Mullay, Inc. v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 509, 511 (10th Cir. 1942). See also
Southern Soya Corp. v. Wasson, 252 S.C. 484, 167 S.E.2d 311 (1969); Adams v. Burt,
245 S.C. 339, 140 S.E.2d 586 (1965).
16. While the federal and South Carolina income taxation statutes are in some ways
similar, they are definitely not the same. In Roper v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 231 S.C. 587,
597, 99 S.E.2d 377, 381-82 (1957),cert. denied, 355 U.S. 913 (1958), Justice Moss stated:
Upon the enactment by the General Assembly of this State of the "Income Tax
4
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that there is a separate provision specifically excluding these de-
ductions under the federal tax laws, but no corresponding state
statute. This would seem to indicate a specific lack of intent by
the General Assembly to include such an exception for South
Carolina.1
7
The majority characterized Scott's action as having "sums
withheld from his statutory retirement pay and applied to the
purchase of an annuity payable to his wife for life should she
survive him."'" Arguing that the consideration for the annuity
should be included in the husband's gross income, although he
would never personally receive the money, the court said:
The benefit to the husband is essentially the same as though he
had contracted with an insurance company for such an annuity
for his wife on her surviving him and assigned this part of his
retirement compensation to the company to pay the
consideration therefor. . . . Surely, the annual consideration
for the annuity contract is part of the husband's compensation.
As such, "in whatever form paid" it is includible in gross in-
come.
19
The result is much the same as if the husband had taken part of
his retirement pay and purchased a life insurance policy on his
own life naming his spouse as beneficiary. No deduction is al-
lowed for an expenditure of this type in South Carolina.2 °
The majority concluded that:
Act of 1926", the Income Tax Act of 1922 was fully and completely repealed.
What was the effect of the repeal?...
It is apparent by the enactment of the "Income Tax Act of 1926" that the
General Assembly decided to have a separate and distinct income tax law. The
repeal of the Income Tax Act of 1922 completely removed from the Income Tax
Laws of South Carolina any reference to the Federal Income Tax Act.
17. Counsel for the Scotts admits in his brief:
[Tihe Tax Study Commission has met for several years and was charged with
studying tax laws of this State and making recommendations to the South
Carolina General Assembly. Under its recent report, the submission of which is
pending before the South Carolina General Assembly, the Committee recom-
mends that Section 122, [26 U.S.C. § 122 (1970)] as set out above, be adopted
and incorporated into the statutes of the State of South Carolina.
Brief for Respondent at 5-6. The logical conclusion to be drawn from this statement is that
the exception, by the taxpayers' own admission, clearly did not exist in South Carolina
at the time in issue.
18. 262 S.C. at 146, 202 S.E.2d at 855.
19. Id. at 147, 202 S.E.2d at 855.
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-265 (1962) states that "in computing net income no deduc-
tion shall in any case be allowed in respect of. . .[p]remiums paid on any life insurance
policy. . .. "
1975]
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The taxpayer has equally enjoyed the fruits of his labor or in-
vestment and obtained the satisfaction of his desires whether he
collects and uses the income to procure those satisfactions, or
whether he disposes of his right to collect it as the means of
procuring them. . . .The power to dispose of income is the
equivalent of ownership of it."
Justice Bussey argued in dissent that the deduction from
Scott's retirement pay was not income because "the recipient
must have an unqualified right to the use and enjoyment of the
money or other property said to be income.122 This view is correct;
Scott, however, had that right and chose, in 1953, to trade it for
the future financial security of his spouse. The dissent relied
heavily upon several Massachusetts cases to support its position;
special emphasis was placed upon Trustees of Amherst College v.
Commissioner of Corps. and Taxation3 where deductions from
the salaries of professors and other college personnel for maintain-
ing retirement plans were held not to constitute taxable income.
While this may be a desirable result, Massachusetts law is not
21. 262 S.C. at 147, 202 S.E.2d at 855-56, quoting Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. at 117-
18. Our court omitted the following section from its quotation, but it is likewise appropri-
ate:
Such a use of his economic gain, the right to receive income, to procure a
satisfaction which can be obtained only by the expenditure of money or prop-
erty, would seem to be the enjoyment of the income whether the satisfaction is
the purchase of goods at the comer grocery, the payment of his debt there, or
such non-material satisfactions as may result from the payment of a campaign
or community chest contribution, or a gift to his favorite son. Even though he
never receives the money he derives money's worth from. . . the procuring of a
satisfaction which is procurable only by the expenditure of money or money's
worth.
311 U.S. at 117.
22. 262 S.C. at 149, 202 S.E.2d at 856 (Bussey, J., dissenting). The dissent continued:
In the instant case neither of the taxpayers nor any member of their family
received, had the right to receive, or '.ad control of within the tax years any
presently tangible economic gain or profit. Cdr. and Mrs. Scott received, and
had the right to receive, only the personal gratification and peace of mind
coming from the knowledge that if Mrs. Scott, perchance, survived Cdr. Scott,
she would eventually actually receive some financial benefit for the remainder
of her life; a state of mind which the law cannot value.
Id. at 152, 202 S.E.2d at 858. This "state of mind" is no different, however, from the
"satisfaction as may result from the payment of a campaign or community chest contribu-
tion" referred to in Horst. See note 21 supra.
23. 354 Mass. 503, 238 N.E.2d 351 (1968). The other case cited is Commissioner of
Corps. & Taxation v. Williston, 315 Mass. 648, 54 N.E.2d 43 (1944), where the state court
refused to follow Horst. See notes 10, 21 and 22 supra. The Massachusetts court's rejection
of the Horst rationale further underscores the difference between the federal tax law and
that of South Carolina and Massachusetts.
6
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dispositive. Members of the South Carolina Retirement System,
for example, are taxed on contributions to that system from their
income. 24 While the dissent's support of the taxpayer is com-
mendable, the exclusion of deductions from retirement pay from
gross income should rest with the legislature. "Whether conform-
ity in this respect with the federal statute should be accomplished
is strictly for legislative judgment.
'25
II. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
In Smith v. Coastal Tire and Auto Service,26 the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court reversed an award of compensation to a
claimant it found to be a casual employee. Although testimony
supporting the award below indicated that the claimant was in-
jured in the course of his employment and that he was involved
in a continuing relationship with his employer, the court, in a
marked departure from its normal standard of review, made a de
novo finding of fact to invalidate the award. In so doing, the court
disregarded its established standard of review and ignored deter-
minations made by the Industrial Commission which were sup-
ported by competent evidence.
The claimant, Matthew Smith, a 16-year-old student at a
private school in Georgia, returned to his parents' home in Beau-
fort during his spring vacation. Claimant's father, the owner and
operator of Coastal Tire and Auto Service, had employed claim-
ant on a sporadic, part-time basis during the previous two years.
On the day before the accident, the father ordered his son placed
on the payroll, beginning the next day, for the balance of his
spring vacation. On his first full day of employment, claimant
reported to work at 8:00 a.m. At 1:00 p.m., Matthew accompanied
his father to lunch. While assisting his father in road-testing an
automobile on their return to work, the son was seriously injured
in an accident.
The claimant filed for benefits under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. 2 A single commissioner found that an employee-
employer relationship existed and entered an award.2 The full
24. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 61-1 et seq. (1962).
25. 262 S.C. at 147, 202 S.E.2d at 855.
26. 263 S.C. 77, 207 S.E.2d 810 (1974).
27. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-1 et seq. (1962).
28. Record at 61.
19751
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commission affirmed. 9 On appeal, the lower court also affirmed
the award,3 and the sole issue before the supreme court was
whether the claimant was a casual employee within the meaning
of the Act.
The term "employee" means every person engaged in an em-
ployment under any appointment, contract of hire or appren-
ticeship, express or implied, oral or written, including aliens and
also including minors, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed,
but excluding a person whose employment is both casual and
not in the course of the trade, business, profession or occupation
of his employer .... 1,
The statutory definition of employee strongly suggests that a
claimant is excluded only if he is both a casual employee and his
work is outside his employer's normal course of business. Another
portion of the Act, however, excludes "casual employees" but
neglects to include the additional condition found in the statutory
definition of employee. 2 The general rule is noted by Professor
Larson:
Employment is "casual" when it is irregular, unpredictable,
sporadic, and brief in nature. Under most statutes, even if cas-
ual, it is not exempt unless it is also outside the usual business
of the employer.3
In Berry v. Atlantic Greyhound Lines, Inc.," the Fourth Cir-
29. Id. at 65.
30. Id. at 67-69.
31. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-11 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-107 (1962).
33. 1A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORMEN'S COMPENSATION § 51.00 (1973).
34. 114 F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 1940). In Berry, an employee of a garage sustained injuries
when the engine of a bus, which the garage had been called upon to repair in an emer-
gency, exploded. Berry's suit at common law for negligence was dismissed because the
court said he should have claimed workmen's compensation against Greyhound. The
South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act is substantially the same as that of North
Carolina:
Our Workmen's Compensation Act having been fashioned to the North Carolina
Workmen's Compensation Act, and practically a copy thereof, the opinions of
the Supreme Court of that State construing such Act are entitled to great
respect.
McDowell v. Stilley Plywood Co., 210 S.C. 173, 181, 41 S.E.2d 872, 876 (1947). The federal
court in Berry relied on Johnson v. Asheville Hosiery Co., 199 N.C. 38, 42, 153 S.E. 591,
594 (1930), where the North Carolina Supreme Court stated that "even if the employment
be causal, the employee is still entitled to compensation if he was injured while 'in the
course of the trade, business, profession or occupation of his employer. . . .'" In Hoffer
Bros. v. Smith, 148 Va. 220, 226, 138 S.E. 474, 476 (1927), the Virginia Supreme Court
[Vol. 27
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cuit construed the South Carolina statutory provision to exclude
from coverage only those claimants whose employment was both
casual and outside the course of business. The South Carolina
Supreme Court, however, specifically repudiated this construc-
tion in Jolly v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp. 5 In considering the two
conflicting sections of the Act, the court determined that the
presence of either condition would preclude recovery:
[There may be an employee, within this definition and the
other terms of the act, whose employment is casual but in the
course of the trade, etc., of his employer's occupation. The latter
qualification makes him an employee, under the definition. But
he is expressly exempted from the terms of the act by section
7035-16 [72-107] which provides beyond peradventure of a
doubt that the law does not apply to casual employees.36
On numerous occasions, the court has had an opportunity to
adopt the general rule. In Ward v. Ocean Forest Club," the su-
preme court almost altered its position and cited with approval
the views of other jurisdictions where "casual employment was
construed as meaning, 'occasional or incidental employment,
which comes without regularity; if the employment be for a defi-
nite time, as for a week or month, it is not casual ... .' "38 Under
noted that "[tihe test is the nature of the employment and not the nature of the contract.
An employment cannot be said to be casual where it is in the usual course of the trade,
business, or occupation of the employer."
35. 207 S.C. 1, 35 S.E.2d 42 (1945).
36. Id. at 7, 35 S.E.2d at 44. Jolly was a filling station attendant at a rural establish-
ment. No auto service was offered at the station other than the sale of gas and oil. A
Greyhound bus came into the station with its engine dead. Obtaining gasoline in a quart
can from the station, the driver asked Jolly to pour the gasoline in the carburetor as he,
the driver, operated the motor's starter from inside the bus. During this operation there
was an explosion and Jolly was severely burned. The supreme court set aside a Workmen's
Compensation award against Greyhound on the ground that Jolly was a casual employee
and thus not entitled to coverage. In so doing, it considered and rejected the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Berry, and made a spurious attempt to distinguish Asheville Hosiery
on its different facts, yet the position of the North Carolina court on the applicable law is
unequivocally clear. See note 34 supra.
37. 188 S.C. 233, 198 S.E. 385 (1938). A waitress, hired to work in a country club
dining room at Myrtle Beach during the tourist season, received transportation as part of
her employment. On the second day of her employment, claimant was injured when the
car in which she was directed to ride was involved in an accident. The supreme court
dismissed her tort action against her employer because the Workmen's Compensation Act
provided an exclusive remedy. In so doing, the court held that she was not a casual
employee. Id. at 243, 198 S.E. at 389.
38. Id. at 242, 198 S.E. at 388, quoting Pallanck v. Donovan, 105 Conn. 591, 136 A.
471 (1927).
9
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this view, neither the length of the employment, nor the fact that
injury occurs shortly after the employee begins work, nor the fact
that injury occurs on the first day of work affords a test to deter-
mine whether his employment was casual." In Benbow v. Ed-
munds High School,40 the court quickly dispelled any such no-
tion:
Under the holding of this Court in the Jolly case, it is sufficient
if it is shown that appellant was a casual employee and it is not
necessary to determine whether he was engaged in the course of
the business of the school. We have no hesitancy in concluding
that his employment was merely casual ...
...While the basic purpose of the Compensation Act is the
inclusion of employees and not their exclusion . . . we are not
at liberty to adopt a construction which does violence to the
specific requirements of the Act. To adopt the reasoning urged
upon us by appellant would necessitate extending the meaning
and effect of our compensation act beyond its fair scope and
purpose.'
In the present action, the employer had clearly directed that
claimant be put on the payroll. The bookkeeper testified, "I do
know that his father told me that starting the 26th, Thursday
morning the 26th, to put him on the payroll. He would go on full
time work during his vacation." 2 The majority opinion ignored
this testimony and attached great significance to the fact that
claimant's prior employment by the company had been sporadic:
The only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the
evidence in this case is that the respondent was not a regular
39. See Industrial Comm'n v. Funk, 68 Colo. 467, 191 P. 125 (1920); Doherty v. Grosse
Isle Twp., 205 Mich. 592, 172 N.W. 596 (1919). One not on the payroll, but allowed to
sleep and remain around a livery barn and occasionally do small jobs for which he was
immediately paid was held to be a casual employee in Diamond Livery v. Industrial
Comm'n, 289 Ill. 591, 124 N.E. 609 (1919). A worker employed for a particular job, requir-
ing only three or four days work, was held to be engaged in casual employment in Chicago
Great V. R.R. v. Industrial Comm'n, 284 Ill. 573, 120 N.E. 508 (1918).
40. 220 S.C. 363, 67 S.E.2d 680 (1951). An employee of an electrical contractor was
sent to a high school to repair a fluorescent light. While at the school he fell from a ladder
and was injured. Since the contractor was not covered under the Act, the employee sought
an award from the high school. Following Ward and Jolly, the court affirmed a denial of
benefits, stating that the claimant was a casual employee and not included in the high
school's coverage.
41. Id. at 370, 372, 67 S.E.2d at 683-84. See also Jolly v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp.,
207 S.C. 1, 35 S.E. 2d 42 (1945); Yeomans v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 198 S.C. 65, 15 S.E.2d
833 (1941).
42. Record at 40.
[Vol. 27
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employee of Coastal Tire and Auto Service, because he worked
on a most irregular, spasmodic and sporadic basis primarily as
he himself chose to do.43
Even though his employment would have lasted only into the
next week when he had to return to school, he was expected to
be working permanently on a full-time basis the following sum-
mer.44 By stipulation, the parties described claimant's employ-
ment:
The employment relationship was quite flexible. The claimant
had no specified days or time when he was required to report for
work. In essence, he would show up when he felt like it and work
for as long or as short a period as he chose.45
In its opinion, the court noted:
It has been held that where employment cannot be character-
ized as permanent or periodically regular, but occurs by chance,
or with the intention and understanding on the part of both
employer and employee that it shall not be continuous, it is
casual.46
The court's characterization of the employment relationship
overlooks certain important details which indicated a more per-
manent or regular employment. Claimant had never before been
placed on the payroll although he had worked for the company
since he was 14 years old. It also appears clear that this employ-
ment was to be for the balance of the vacation and would be
followed by full-time employment during the summer vacation.
In DeBerry v. Coker Freight Lines,47 the court indicated that
a liberal interpretation should be given to the Act to extend its
coverage whenever possible:
If we had any doubt, which we do not, that the respondent was
within the coverage of the Compensation Act, in order to effec-
43. 263 S.C. at 82, 207 S.E.2d at 812. The transcript of the testimony shows that in
the past Matthew had worked "off and on." Record at 17, 18, 27, 36, 40.
44. Id. at 26, 28.
45. 263 S.C. at 81, 207 S.E.2d at 811, quoting Record at 1.
46. Id., 207 S.E.2d at 812, citing 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 69 (1958).
47. 234 S.C. 304, 108 S.E.2d 114 (1959). DeBerry involved a truck and its driver which
were leased to a common carrier in interstate commerce to haul plywood to other states.
The court found the common carrier to be a special employer. Thus, the driver was not
an independent contractor, but an employee; the carrier was held liable under the Act
for the driver's injuries. In the course of its discussion, the supreme court reviewed deci-
sions in Jolly, Ward, and Benbow.
19751
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tuate the basic purpose of said act, we must resolve that doubt
in favor of the respondent and find that he is covered by the said
act. Doubt as to whether an employee is covered by said act
must be resolved in favor of coverage rather than exclusion."
Justice Lewis noted, in his well-reasoned dissent, the similarities
between Coastal Tire and DeBerry:
Here, as in DeBerry, the- employment was for a relatively brief
period of time, but such did not happen by chance or accident.
As in DeBerry it was the result of an agreement between the
parties to perform services in the regular business of the em-
ployer and the fact that the claimant was injured shortly after
his employment began does not make him a casual employee
within the meaning of the act. Here as in DeBerry any doubt as
to coverage has to be resolved in favor of coverage."
Although much could be stated about the public policy of the Act
and the goals it was designed to achieve, it suffices to note that-
the Act must be given a broad construction favoring inclusion.
It is of no small significance that the single commissioner,
the full commission, and the lower court all agreed that the
claimant was entitled to an award. In reviewing an award, the
supreme court is "limited to a determination of whether or not
there is any competent evidence to support the factual findings
of the Commission."5 The single commissioner included as one
of his findings of fact "that the claimant, Matthew George Smith,
was an employee of the above named employer on March 26,
1970." ' The South Carolina Industrial Commission stated:
The grounds for appeal were considered according to the evi-
dence and applicable law. No error was found in the Hearing
Commissioner's Award, Findings of Fact, or Rulings of Law.
Accordingly, the determination as issued on January 28, 1972,
is hereby affirmed.2
The lower court recognized that competent evidence might sup-
48. Id. at 316, 108 S.E.2d at 121.
49. 263 S.C. 77, 85-86, 207 S.E.2d 810, 814 (1974) (Lewis and Bussey, J.J., dissent-
ing).
50. Black v. Barnwell County, 243 S.C. 531, 535, 134 S.E.2d 753, 755 (1964). See, e.g.,
Arnold v. Benjamin Booth Co., 257 S.C. 337, 185 S.E.2d 830 (1971); Polk v. E.I. duPont
de Nemours Co., 250 S.C. 468, 158 S.E.2d 765 (1968); Herndon v. Morgan Mills, Inc., 246
S.C. 201, 143 S.E.2d 376 (1965).
51. Record at 59, 61 (Opinion filed January 28, 1972).
52. Id. at 65 (Order filed May 9, 1972, by Commissioner James J. Reid).
[Vol. 27
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port a different conclusion but accorded the Commission's find-
ings their proper weight:
From employment records there is a serious question that young
Smith was an employee at all, but there is testimony that on the
day of the accident he was an employee actually assisting his
father in testing the vehicle involved in the accident. This testi-
mony is sufficient to support the conclusion of the Commission
and cannot be overturned by this Court ...
If "casual employment" means accidental or happening or
coming to pass without design and without being expected or
foreseeable, then the irregular and uncertain manner in which
young Smith works does not fall within "casual". South Caro-
lina has yet to formulate a precise definition of "casual employ-
ment" such as to be excluded from the Act. Inasmuch as there
is definite testimony that he was employed on March 26, 1970,
and within the scope of his employment when injured, the
award is affirmed and the exceptions are dismissed. 3
In light of these successive actions, there was clearly competent
evidence to support the award, and it should not have been over-
turned. The supreme court, in reversing the award, went beyond
its established procedures and made a de novo determination in
the case.
The supreme court failed to resolve the continuing contro-
versy over its definition of a casual employee and whether such
an employee is entitled to coverage if injured in the course of his
employer's business. In reversing an award based on competent
evidence, the court missed an opportunity to bring its interpreta-
tion of the Act in line with that of the great weight of authority
in the United States. Ignoring the public policy considerations
under which the statute was enacted, the court extended the
exclusion of coverage. Finally, the court failed to follow its own
established administrative procedures for judicial review and re-
jected repeated findings of fact supported by competent, albeit
inconclusive, evidence.
IIl. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
In recent years, there has been a trend toward more critical
examination of Social Security Administration decisions.
53. Id. at 67, 69 (Order dated August 30, 1973).
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[C]ourts are no longer willing to approve the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare's decisions without being con-
vinced that findings are, on the whole record, based upon sub-
stantial evidence. Indeed, the courts appear willing to remand
or reverse such decisions more than ever before. A critical ap-
proach by the courts, moreover, comports with the basic prem-
ise of the Social Security Act and is more amenable to a liberal
construction of the Act in favor of claimants.54
In Black v. Richardson," the court reversed a denial of disability
benefits where the hearing examiner relied on a neutral medical
advisor's skeptical explanation of a physician's report submitted
to establish the claimant's reduced lung capacity. The court de-
cided that it was unable to determine, as a matter of law, whether
the Secretary's findings were supported by substantial evidence
and remanded for further proceedings. In so doing, the court was
highly critical of the hearing which was conducted in apparent
disregard of the consideration to which a claimant is entitled. In
Byrd v. Richardson,56 the hearing examiner relied on a single
report, which described claimant's arthritic condition of the spine
and hands as minimal, to determine that she was not totally
disabled. In its review, the court noted the existence of a conflict-
ing medical report, which the hearing examiner had dismissed,
and references to still other hospital reports which appeared cap-
able of resolving the conflict had they been included in the record.
The court reversed and remanded to the Secretary to obtain and
consider these other records, citing the "duty of impartiality and
basic fairness which is imposed on the hearing examiner.
'57
This critical trend was continued in Martin v. Secretary of
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare," when the
Fourth Circuit held that the opinion of a nonexamining Social
Security doctor was not substantial evidence to sustain the re-
fusal of disability benefits when subjective evidence of disability,
expert medical opinion of examining physicians, claimant's voca-
tional history, and objective facts were all to the contrary.5 In the
54. Administrative Law, 1973 Survey of S.C. Law, 26 S.C.L. REV. 165, 174 (1974).
55. 356 F. Supp. 861 (D.S.C. 1973).
56. 362 F. Supp. 957 (D.S.C. 1973).
57. Id. at 963.
58. 492 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1974).
59. Id. at 908.
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same opinion, the court invalidated the Secretary's regulation,"0
or the interpretation of this regulation, which set out specified
end organ damage as an exclusive prerequisite to establishing a
disability from hypertension or diabetes. The court held the regu-
lation to fall outside the scope of the Secretary's authority to
promulgate regulations "not inconsistent" with the provisions of
the Social Security Act.6"
To qualify for Social Security disability benefits, claimants
must prove disability by showing a medically determinable phys-
ical or mental disability which prevents their engaging in sub-
stantial gainful employment.62 The scope of judicial review of the
Secretary's decision is narrow, and the Secretary's factual deter-
60. The Secretary's regulation, 20 C.F.R. Appendix to Subpart P, part 404, § 4.00 C
states:
C. Hypertensive vascular disease produces disability when it causes complica-
tions in one or more of the main end organs; i.e., the heart, the brain, the
kidneys, and the eyes (retinas). This may occur singly or in combination and to
varying degrees in the different end organs.
In addition, § 4.03 lists, by reference to other sections, the types of complications to the
end organs from hypertension that would establish disability, including hypertensive
retinopathy, impaired renal function, cerebrovascular damage, congestive heart failure,
and angina pectoris.
61. 492 F.2d at 910.
62. The pertinent sections of 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1970) are as follows:
(d)(1) The term "disability" means-
(A) inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months;
(d)(2) For purposes of paragraph (1)(A)-
(A) an individual. . . shall be determined to be under a disability only if
his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he
is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age,
education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful
work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work
exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy
exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. For purposes
of the preceding sentence (with respect to any individual), "work which exists
in the national economy" means work which exists in significant numbers either
in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.
(d)(3) For purposes of this subsection, a "physical or mental impairment" is an
impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnor-
malities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and labora-
tory diagnostic techniques.
(d)(5) An individual shall not be considered to be under a disability unless he
furnishes such medical and other evidence of the existence thereof as the Secre-
tary may require.
See Harris v. Richardson, 450 F.2d 1099 (4th Cir. 1971).
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minations are conclusive when supported by substantial evi-
dence. 3 The phrase, "substantial evidence", has been defined as
evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to
support a particular conclusion. It consists of more than a mere
scintilla of evidence, but may be somewhat less than a prepon-
derance. If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a ver-
dict were the case before a jury, then there is "substantial evi-
dence." 4
As these cases indicate, the courts are reviewing decisions in a
critical manner, and no longer hesitate to set aside a decision if
necessary to ensure fundamental fairness. 5
In Martin, the claimant alleged inability to engage in sub-
stantial gainful employment due to diabetes and high blood pres-
sure. The Secretary denied disability benefits and the district
court affirmed. The circuit court reversed. Mrs. Martin, a 49-
year-old mill weaver, who ceased employment in 1966, had an
extensive medical history. She suffered from diabetes and severe
hypertension, had undergone a simple mastectomy of one breast
and had benign cysts removed from the other, had suffered a 30
percent hearing loss in each ear, and had suffered arterial changes
in her eyes. The basis for her disability claim was limited, how-
ever, to the diabetes and blood pressure problems. The dispute
centered on whether she retained a functional capacity to work.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970) states in part:
(g) Any individual, after the final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing
to which he was a party ... may obtain a review of such decision by a civil
action .... Such action shall be brought in the district court .... As part
of his answer the Secretary shall file a certified copy of the transcript of the
record including the evidence upon which the findings and decision compained
of are based. The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and
transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the deci-
sion of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. The
findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive....
64. Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966). See Woolridge v. Cele-
brezze, 214 F. Supp. 686 (S.D. W. Va. 1963).
65. Flack v. Cohen, 413 F.2d 278, 279-80 (4th Cir. 1969), notes that the findings of
an administrative agency are not to be mechanically accepted: "The statutorily granted
right of review contemplates more than an uncritical rubber stamping of the administra-
tive action." The same court, referring to the informality of the hearing for determination
of eligibility for benefits, where the only witness might be the claimant himself, and the
rest of the record consisted only of official forms filled out by various persons not now
present, said, "These features of the administrative process in the disability area dictate
that the courts closely scrutinize the administrative proceedings to insure a result consis-
tent with congressional intent and elemental fairness." Id.
[Vol. 27
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Mrs. Martin testified to her subjective symptoms, claiming
headaches, shortness of breath, dizzy spells resulting in nausea
and vomiting, occasional loss of orientation, an inability to oper-
ate a motor vehicle, and intermittent extreme weakness which
resulted in her becoming bedridden.66 Her medical records fully
substantiated these claims, and both her personal physician and
an impartial doctor from the South Carolina Vocational Rehabili-
tation Department supported her claim of physical unfitness for
work. Concluding a specific physical condition report, her per-
sonal doctor stated, "I believe this patient is eligible for total,
permanent disability for any gainful employment."67 The neutral
internist, acting as a consultant to the Vocational Rehabilitation
Department, related his physical findings and added:
This patient has two major problems each of which singularly
being able to produce profound vascular degeneration and
which in combination is a truly deadly pair of diseases.
[Ilt is the opinion of this examiner that her hypertension
is so severe and has been of sufficient duration as to preclude
returning her to a semblance of good health.68
Countering this evidence was the opinion of the Social
Security Administration's nonexamining doctor who testified at
the hearing and submitted a report. Both his opinion and report
were based solely on Mrs. Martin's medical records and not on
an examination of the claimant or on independent tests. His con-
clusion was that she had "essential hypertension," extremely
high diastolic pressures, and diabetes without end organ damage.
Based on these findings, he concluded that Mrs. Martin was
physically able to do light work. A vocational expert for the Social
Security Board testified that there were several sedentary-type
jobs that Mrs. Martin could perform. 9 The hearing examiner
consequently based his recommendation for rejection of her claim
for disability benefits on findings that there was no end organ
damage from her physical ailments, and that there were jobs
within the local economy which she was capable of performing.
66. 492 F.2d at 906.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 906-07.
69. The Social Security Board vocational expert and the hearing examiner indicated
that Mrs. Martin could work as a cashier in a restaurant, laundry, or movie theater; she
could be a laundrette attendant, folder, or fluffer; she could be a personnel assistant,
toolroom attendant, or shirt packer or inspector. Id. at 907.
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As the rejection of the claim could be supported only by the
opinion of the nonexamining Social Security physician, the court
held that, in light of all the evidence presented to the contrary,
his evidence was not sufficiently substantial to sustain the re-
sult.7" The court relied on Hayes v. Gardner7 1 as controlling on
both facts and law, stating:
In Hayes, . . . we held, where a claimant's principal compaint
was hypertension, that the opinion of a doctor who never exam-
ined or treated the claimant could not serve as substantial evi-
dence for a finding of non-disability when it was, as in the in-
stant case, at odds with the objective medical facts, claimant's
uncontradicted subjective evidence, the opinion evidence of
claimant's examining physicians, and her vocational back-
ground. 2
Thus, it appears that the opinion of a nonexamining Social Secu-
rity physician, if contradicted, must have some support from
other sources to be sufficient as substantial evidence to justify the
70. Id. at 908.
71. 376 F.2d 517 (4th Cir. 1967). Hayes was a similar case involving denial of disabil-
ity benefits for a 54-year-old woman who had been treated by her own doctor for hyperten-
sion for over 20 years. She also had an extensive surgical history, including a hysterec-
tomy, left salpingectomy, appendectomy, hermioplasty, hemorrhoidectomy, and a D&C.
Her personal physician's report said, "She is totally disabled for work. This applicant has
had hypertension since March 1950. She has tried to work all the time. I feel she is now
totally and permanently disabled." Id. at 519. A Social Security doctor gave an opinion
based solely on his examination of the medical record, and concluded there was no reason
"why she couldn't do light forms of work that didn't involve any heavy lifting or straining
or involve physical strain." Id. The district court indicated that the evidence of the
claimant was stronger than that of the government, but the opinion of the nonexamining
physician forced him to support the government's position. In reversing that decision, the
circuit court said:
We reach the conclusion that, in view of the opinion evidence as to the existence
of a disability, combined with the overwhelming medical facts, the uncontrad-
icted subjective evidence, and claimant's vocational background, the opinion of
a doctor who never examined or treated the claimant cannot serve as substantial
evidence to support the Secretary's finding.
Id. at 520-21.
72. 492 F.2d at 908. Cf. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971); Kyle v. Cohen,
449 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1971). In Perales, a written report from a physician which was
contradicted by claimant and his treating doctor was held to be substantial evidence to
support denial of benefits, but this written report and opinion was based on an actual
medical examination of the claimant. The opinion of the nonexamining physician did not
differ from the medical reports of the examining physicians. In Kyle, the Secretary's
denial of benefits was upheld, where evidence unfavorable to the claimant consisted of
the testimony of the Social Security Administration's medical advisor and the Adminis-
tration's vocational expert, but was corroborated by the opinions of two or more physicians
who had examined Kyle and found him not disabled.
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Secretary's decision not to award disability status.
A second major result of Martin was the invalidation of the
Secretary's regulation requiring end organ damage as a prerequi-
site to acceptance of a disability claim. The court rejected this
regulation, saying that "[n]othing in the Social Security Act
requires rejection of a disability claim for hypertension or diabe-
tes simply because the claimant has not yet experienced end
organ damage. ' 73 The Act itself refers merely to an "inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity. . . . ,,7 The Secretary
had presented no evidence to show that only end organ damage
was sufficient to prevent an individual from being able to work,
and the court concluded:
Short of evidence that hypertension or diabetes, or both, can
only prevent a person from engaging in any substantial gainful
activity when it results in end organ damage, we do not think
that the Secretary has the authority, to say that end organ dam-
age is an exclusive precondition to the establishment of a dis-
ability from hypertension. There is no such evidence in this
case .... 7-
As the Secretary's regulation-making authority is limited to those
"not inconsistent" with the provisions of the Act,76 and as the Act
itself did not require end organ damage where other evidence of
disability was offered, the court rejected the construction of the
regulation establishing such end organ damage as the sole means
to validate a disability from hypertension or diabetes.
7
In Martin, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals continued to
show a willingness to reverse a denial of benefits where the evi-
dence presented by the Social Security Administration was ade-
quately contradicted by actual medical examinations. The court
also rejected an administrative regulation which had placed a
restrictive interpretation on the amount of actual damage neces-
73. 492 F.2d at 909.
74. See note 62 supra.
75. 492 F.2d at 910.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1970) states:
The Secretary shall have full power and authority to make rules and regulations
and to establish procedures, not inconsistent with the provisions of this sub-
chapter, which are necessary or appropriate to carry out such provisions, and
shall adopt reasonable and proper rules and regulations to regulate and provide
for the nature and extent of proofs and evidence and the method of taking and
furnishing the same in order to establish the rights to benefits hereunder.
77. 492 F.2d at 910.
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sary to establish a disability and thus gain benefits. The decision
indicates that the court is ready to adopt a more liberal position
in its interpretation of the Act.
IV. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
In a recent case, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
stricted the grounds for denials of information sought under the
Freedom of Information Act"8 (hereinafter FOIA) to the excep-
tions expressly stated in the act itself. 9 Simultaneously, the court
expanded the exception covering "investigatory files compiled for
law enforcement purposes"" to include information gathered in
conjunction with the nonadversarial investigation of union repre-
sentation election activities prior to the filing of any unfair labor
practice charge by the National Labor Relations Board.
In Wellman Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 1 the circuit court,
although rejecting the district court's reasoning, affirmed the
lower court's denial of access to information under the FOIA. The
company had sought disclosure of affidavits given to an NLRB
investigator during his investigation into union objections to a
representation election held at the company's Johnsonville plant.
That election was set aside. In a second election, the union was
chosen as the bargaining representative for the employees. The
company objected to certification of the union, but its objection
78. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
79. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970) sets out nine exceptions:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are-
(1) specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the inter-
est of the national defense or foreign policy;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from
a person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not
be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the
extent available by law to a party other than an agency;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports
prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regula-
tion or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, con-
cerning wells.
80. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970).
81. 490 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1974).
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was dismissed and the Regional Director denied a request for
review. After Wellman refused the union's request to bargain, the
NLRB issued a complaint charging Wellman with refusal to bar-
gain under the National Labor Relations Act 2 (hereinafter
NLRA). Wellman countered with the defense of improper certifi-
cation. The NLRB then moved for summary judgment and the
case was transferred to the Board in Washington. Wellman filed
a statement opposing the summary judgment and cross-motions
seeking the affidavits and memorandums under the FOIA. The
motion for summary judgment was denied and the case remanded
to the Regional Director for a hearing on the question of newly-
discovered evidence relating to the second election.
In the meantime, the company filed the complaint in the
present action, seeking the affidavits. The Board opposed the
request and claimed that the information was exempted from
disclosure by the exceptions for "trade secrets" and "investiga-
tory files." 3 The district court denied disclosure without ruling
on the issue of the exceptions. Because issuance of an injunction
might have resulted in a circuity of action and an adequate rem-
edy at law was available, the lower court relied on its equitable
power to withhold relief and stated: "Foremost in the mind of the
court is the fact that the question of the Plaintiff's rights under
the Freedom of Information Act will be before the Circuit Court
of Appeals in the very near future, whether this Court does or does
not issue an injuction. ' '1 4 The district judge explained this
balancing approach, stating, "[I]n considering whether or not to
issue an injunction, this Court must consider all of the facts be-
fore it, the purposes and needs of the parties, the burdens in-
volved, the importance of the information and the reasons for
nondisclosure." 5 Although not making an actual determination,
the district court indicated its view that the "investigatory files"
exception was a rather weak justification for nondisclosure:
[I]t must be remembered that this is not information originallycontained in "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement
82. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970) states:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employ-
ees. ...
83. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4), (7) (1970); see note 79 supra.
84. 490 F.2d at 429 (from the district court's unreported order).
85. Id. at 429 n.2.
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purposes." The statements and affidavits were taken in connec-
tion with the certification election, a non-adversary proceeding,
and before any complaint was brought by the Board for an un-
fair labor practice."
On appeal, the circuit court noted that, while a balancing
approach was not without support, ' it preferred a less stringent
standard:
After considering voluminous testimony on both sides and bal-
ancing the public, private, and administrative interests, Con-
gress decided that the best course was open access to the govern-
mental process with a very few exceptions. It is not the province
of the courts to restrict that legislative judgment under the guise
of judicially balancing the same interests that Congress has con-
sidered."8
The court also noted that Robles v. Environmental Protection
Agency" had dispensed with the argument that disclosure should
be refused whenever it would yield more harm than good, because
the Act did not provide for such a balancing of equities. Adhering
to that view, the court held that the Act means what it says:
"This section does not authorize withholding of information or
limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifi-
86. Id. at 429 n.I.
87. In General Servs. Administration v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969), a
member of a partnership which had purchased property from the General Services Admin-
istration was able to compel that agency to turn over records of the transaction because
the records were needed to show the proper characterization of profit for tax purposes upon
the partnership's sale of the property. The court noted:
In exercising the equity jurisdiction conferred by the Freedom of Information
Act, the court must weigh the effects of disclosure and nondisclosure according
to traditional equity principles, and determine the best course to follow in the
given circumstances.
Id. at 880. The agency had claimed the information exempt from disclosure under the
exceptions for "trade secrets or confidential commercial information" (exception 4), and
for "memorandums or letters not available by law to a party other than another agency
in litigation" (exception 5). See Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans
Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), where it was noted that the balance
of equities is presumptively on the side of disclosure.
88. Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 24-25 (4th Cir. 1971), quoted in 490 F.2d at 429.
In Wellford, the court affirmed the lower court's decision directing the Secretary of Agri-
culture to make public certain warning letters sent to poultry and meat processors and to
release information about administrative detention of those products.
89. 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973). In Robles, an action for release of the EPA's informa-
tion with respect to homes where uranium tailings had been used for fill, Judge Russell
wrote that "the right to disclosure under the Act is not to be resolved by a balancing of
equities or a weighing of need or even benefit." Id. at 848.
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cally stated .. ."90
Having determined that the affidavits must be released un-
less protected by a specific stated exception, the court then found
that the information sought by Wellman was included within the
exception of "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement
purposes."91 The previous examples used by the NLRB to justify
nondisclosure under this exception applied to files assembled
after an unfair labor practice complaint had been filed,9 2 but the
court indicated that so restrictive an interpretation called for too
narrow a view of the phrase, "law enforcement purposes.'""
Under the NLRA, employees are given the right to organize
and bargain collectively:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization .... to bar-
gain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activi-
ties except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment. .... .1
The NLRB is also charged with the duty to oversee elections, to
investigate any alleged election irregularities, and to certify the
chosen bargaining representatives. The Board has been given
wide discretion by Congress to enforce these rights,9" and once an
90. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970).
91. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970), quoted in 490 F.2d at 429.
92. 490 F.2d at 430. See Clement Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 282 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Ga.
1968); Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967).
93. Id. In Evans v. Department of Transp., 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), a commercial
airline pilot sought the release of a letter to the Federal Aviation Administration. Some-
time shortly after he had been discharged by his employer, a major air carrier, the FAA
had received the letter, asking what steps the writer should follow to bring an unnamed
pilot's acts of behavior disorder and mental abnormality to the attention of the appropri-
ate authorities. The letter expressed the strongest desire for confidentiality. In resulting
action, the FAA summarily suspended the pilot's medical certificate and required him to
undergo psychiatric evaluation and testing. Upon completion, his medical certificate was
returned; as a result of arbitration, he was later rehired by his former employer. The pilot
suspected that the original letter had been sent by his employer and wanted to examine
the letter to be certain. The letter was not released. Although received by the FAA before
any action had been taken against the pilot, and therefore clearly not a response to any
official investigation, the court concluded that the letter qualified for exception from
disclosure as part of an investigatory file for law enforcement purposes.
94. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
95. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
96. NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330 (1946): "Congress has entrusted the
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investigation of an election has begun, that investigation may
lead to commencement of an unfair labor practice action. 7 Elec-
tion irregularities may be the basis of a formal complaint" or, as
here, may only cause the results of the election to be voided and
a second election held. In Wellman, the results of the first election
were discarded and another balloting ordered; the company, how-
ever, was unable to obtain direct review of that determination.
Instead, it was forced to refuse to bargain in order to challenge
the union's certification. 9
The court indicated that even if the company had not even-
tually been charged with an unfair labor practice, the investiga-
tions made by the Board, including the taking of the original
affidavits in question, still had been made to protect the employ-
ees' rights to organize and bargain collectively. The court be-
lieved this stage of action to warrant nondisclosure: "Though
procedures vary, if aimed at enforcement of the NLRA, we think
they are 'for law enforcement purposes.' "101
The court noted the legislative history of the investigatory
files exception to the FOIA, quoting from the House Report:
"This exemption covers investigatory files related to enforcement
of all kinds of laws, labor and securities laws as well as criminal
laws. This would include files prepared in connection with related
Government litigation and adjudicative proceedings."'' 1 In prac-
tice, this exception facilitates the collection of information by
insuring the confidentiality of statements. An employee who
knows that his employer can gain access to a statement is less
likely to make a complete statement, especially one that would
incriminate his employer. ' A second reason for denying access
Board with a wide degree of discretion in establishing the procedure and safeguards
necessary to insure the fair and free choice of bargaining representatives by employees."
See Schneider Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 375, 378 (4th Cir. 1968).
97. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1970) specifies five unfair labor practices.
98. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
99. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970). See Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 476-77
(1964), where Justice Stewart stated:
[I]n the normal course of events Board orders in certification proceedings under
§ 9(c) are not directly reviewable in the courts. . . .Such decisions, rather, are,
normally reviewable only where the dispute concerning the correctness of the
certification eventuates in a finding by the Board that an unfair labor practice
has been committed as, for example, where an employer refuses to bargain with
a certified representative. ...
100. 490 F.2d at 430.
101. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1966), quoted in 490 F.2d at 430.
102. 490 F.2d at 431. The court used language from NLRB v. National Survey Serv.,
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to an employer is the NLRB's desire to preserve its strongest
possible case for presentation in court by preventing premature
disclosure of an investigation. 10 In addition, since no arbitrary
action by the Board had been shown, the court concluded that the
company could await a final order of the Board before pursuing
its right of review under the NLRA. 104
The circuit court limited nondisclosure of information to the
specific exceptions listed in the FOIA itself and rejected the lower
court's balancing test as determinative of the propriety of disclo-
sure. This action indicates that the nominal purpose of the
FOIA-expanded and freer access to agency information-is sup-
ported by the court. The court, however, expanded the "investi-
gatory files" exception to include information obtained in investi-
gations conducted prior to the filing of any unfair labor practice
complaint. This expansion appears justified since it complies
with the congressional intent. Nondisclosure protects information
related to enforcement of all laws, including labor laws, and al-
lows accumulation of more reliable and useful information while
protecting any eventual legal proceeding by the government.
V. BUREAU OF CUSTOMS
In States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Schultz,"5 the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the district court's dismissal"5 of a suit
against the Secretary of the Treasury and other officials of the
Inc., 361 F.2d 199, 206 (7th Cir. 1966) quoted in Intertype Co. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 41, 45
(4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1049 (1969): "If an employee knows that statements
made by him will be revealed to an employer, he is less likely, for fear of reprisal, to make
an uninhibited and nonevasive statement." Note that the court fails to consider that if
the Company wants the information for the light it sheds on the case before the Board,
the affidavits should be released. Any use of the documents to retaliate against the em-
ployees (an unfair labor practice) can be prevented by enforcement of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)
(1970). Note also, however, that although the employer's act will eventually be con-
demned, its present effect will be to chill employee disclosures. The decision here may
be generally correct, but the issue is not so one-sided as the court's opinion indicates.
103. Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971).
104. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970) states in pertinent part:
(f) Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in
whole or part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in any United
States court of appeals in the circuit where the unfair labor practice in question
was alleged to have been engaged in or wherein such person resides or transacts
business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
105. 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974).
106. 359 F. Supp. 512 (D.S.C. 1973).
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Bureau of Customs for incidental and consequential damages re-
sulting from a seizure of certain cargo and a year's delay in the
commencement of forfeiture proceedings. The court held that
such administrative inaction was violative of the fifth amend-
ment's proscription against deprivation of property without due
process of law. The court, moreover, held that an action against
the officers in their individual capacities was not barred by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.
A freighter chartered by States Marine Lines docked at
Charleston. Customs officers boarded the vessel, seized a portion
of the cargo without permission, and transported the confiscated
material to the United States Customs House. Protesting that the
seizure was wrongful, States offered to post security to obtain
release of its cargo, but the District Director of Customs refused.
Thirteen days later, government officers notified States that
some of the seized cargo was being held subject to forfeiture for
alleged violations of customs law and that interested persons
could apply for return of the cargo and for remission or mitigation
of penalties. For nearly two months, States endeavored, without
success, to obtain the cargo's release. Ultimately, States filed a
petition with the Secretary of the Treasury claiming that there
had been no violation of customs law and requesting remission or
mitigation of the penalty and forfeiture. The Secretary, however,
took no action on this petition, despite repeated written and ver-
bal requests by States.
Six months after the initial seizure, the government notified
States that additional items were being held subject to forfeiture.
States responded by filing an amended petition which indicated
that continued detention of the cargo was causing irreparable
damage. The government remained inactive and informed States
that the delay was attributable to the bureaucratic process. Ten
months later, States notified the Bureau of Customs that if its
petition did not receive immediate action, legal proceedings
would follow. The Bureau gave oral assurances but took no ac-
tion. Throughout this 16-month period, States was forced to pay
claims for nondelivery.
States ultimately filed suit in the district court seeking in-
junctive relief ordering institution of forfeiture proceedings or res-
toration of its cargo and incidental and consequential damages.
After being ordered by the district court to show cause why it
should not commence forfeiture proceedings or restore the cargo,
the Bureau determined that no violation of customs law had oc-
[Vol. 27
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curred and that the forfeiture of the cargo and associated penal-
ties should be remitted and the seized goods released. Once the
cargo had been returned to States, the action became one solely
for damages suffered during the period of detention of the mer-
chandise. The government then moved for dismissal of the suit
for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief could be
granted and because the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the suit. In dismissing the suit with prejudice,' ° the
district court claimed the Federal Tort Claims Act0 s was inappl-
icable,"°9 that a statutory grant of general jurisdiction to the dis-
trict courts did not constitute governmental consent to be sued,"0
107. Id.
108. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671 et seq.
(1970). Most of the substantive portions appear in §§ 2671-80.
109. 359 F. Supp. at 514. Setting out liability in general, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970)
states in pertinent part:
(b) [T]he district courts .. .shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions
on claims against the United States, for money damages . . .for injury or loss
of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act
or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope
of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of
the place where the act or omission occurred.
This general liability is then restricted by 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1970) which states in part:
The provisions of this chapter [Exceptions] and Section 1346(b) of this title
shall not apply to-
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Govern-
ment, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether
or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or perform-
ance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the
discretion involved be abused.
(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax
or customs duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of
customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer.
Judge Simons stated in his order:
This statute [28 U.S.C. § 2680] effectively forecloses any reliance by plaintiff
on the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(b). Plaintiff's counsel
conceded as much in oral argument, recognizing that there was no cause of
action cognizable under the Tort Claims Act.
359 F. Supp. at 514.
110. 359 F. Supp. at 514-15. Plaintiff stated that jurisdiction was conferred by 28
U.S.C. § 1340 (1970) which provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress providing for internal revenue, or
revenue from imports or tonnage except matters within the jurisdiction of the Customs
Court." The lower court noted:
Plaintiff's reliance on this statute is misplaced. . . . [A]ny reliance on the
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that mandamus was inappropriate since the goods had already
been returned,"' that the suit, although supposedly against the
named individuals, was actually against the sovereign,"' that the
two established exceptions to the general rule of sovereign im-
munity were inapplicable"' and that 28 U.S.C. § 2006 did not
jurisdictional grant of Section 1340 "must be buttressed by some other statute
specifically waiving the sovereign immunity of the United States in a particular
type of action." Cooper Agency, Inc. v. McLeod, 235 F. Supp. 276 (E.D. S.C.
1964), aff 'd per curiam, 348 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1965). Plaintiff here has directed
the court to no such buttressing statute.
359 F. Supp. at 515.
111. 359 F. Supp. at 515. Plaintiff contended that the action was properly before the
court by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970) which states: "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or
employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the
plaintiff."
112. 359 F. Supp. at 515. The court relied on a test laid down in Land v. Dollar, 330
U.S. 731, 738 (1947), which indicated that a suit was, in effect, against the state if "the
judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain. The district
judge then added:
The effect of the instant action, if successful, would be to "expend itself on the
public treasury," for there is little doubt that if plaintiff recovered a verdict
against the named defendants individually, such verdict would eventually be
enforceable against the United States. Cf. 19 U.S.C. Sec. 508, 28 U.S.C. Sec.
2006. The court must thus conclude that the action is one against the sovereign.
The courts cannot entertain an unconsented suit which, while nominally against
officers of the United States, is in reality against the government itself.
359 F. Supp. at 515. 19 U.S.C. § 508 (1970) states:
If any officer, or other person, executing or aiding or assisting in the seizure of
goods, under any Act providing for or regulating the collection of duties on
imports or tonnage, is sued for anything done in virtue of the powers given
thereby, or by virtue of a warrant granted by any judge, or justice, pursuant to
law, he may plead the general issue and give such Act and the special matter
in evidence.
28 U.S.C. § 2006 (1970) states:
Execution shall not issue against a collector or other revenue officer on a final
judgment in any proceeding against him for any of his acts, or for the recovery
of any money exacted by or paid to him and subsequently paid into the Treas-
ury, in performing his official duties, if the court certifies that:
(1) probable cause existed; or
(2) the officer acted under the directions of the Secretary of the Treasury
or other proper Government officer.
When such certificate has been issued, the amount of the judgment shall be paid
out of the proper appropriation by the Treasury.
113. 359 F. Supp. at 515-18. The exceptions are set out in Larson v. Domestic &
Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 683, 701-02 (1949), which stated:
[T]he action of an officer of the sovereign (be it holding, taking or otherwise
legally affecting the plaintiff's property) can be regarded as so "illegal" as to
permit a suit for specific relief against the officer as an individual only if it is
not within the officer's statutory powers or, if within those powers, only if the
28




The district court devoted much of its opinion to a discussion
of the concept of sovereign immunity. The suit, however, re-
mained one directed against the named officials in their individ-
ual capacities. Congress does have the power to underwrite judg-
ments against individual officials; the respective interests of gov-
ernment officials who are performing their duties"5 should be
balanced with those of citizens who suffer damage by such ac-
tions.' The district court, however, could find no specific waiver
of immunity and concluded:
Although the court is sympathetic with the plight of the plain-
tiff, who has been deprived of the use of its property for a sub-
stantial period of time, and whose proper requests for adminis-
trative relief were ignored until suit was brought, nevertheless
the court can find no justification in the law for its jurisdiction
attaching to this suit for the purposes of affording the plaintiff
the resulting and consequential damages it seeks. The court
must conclude that this action cannot be maintained because
of the sovereign immunity of the United States. For, in sub-
stance, this is an action against the United States. And since the
powers, or their exercise in the particular case, are constitutionally void.
The lower court said that the seizure was clearly within the scope of the customs agent's
authority. This statement is irrelevant because the issue does not concern the validity of
the original seizure, but rather the failure to take any action despite numerous admoni-
tions and the resulting unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of
law, which would give rise to damages. The remainder of the district court's opinion is
addressed to this aspect, and it determines that the exercise of authority (inaction) was
not constitutionally void.
114. 359 F. Supp. at 518. 28 U.S.C. § 2006 (1970) is set out at note 112 supra. The
court reasoned that merely because a successful suit would result in payment from the
Treasury under authority of this statute, the statute cannot be said to provide jurisdiction
in the first instance.
115. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959), stated:
It has been thought important that officials of government should be free to
exercise their duties unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect of acts
done in the course of those duties -suits which would consume time and ener-
gies which would otherwise by devoted to governmental service and the threat
of which might appreciably inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective adminis-
tration of policies of government.
116. See note 113 supra. The cases which have relied on the exceptions in Larson have
all involved requests for specific relief. See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963) (injunction
to permit storing and diverting of water at dam); Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962)
(ejectment of Forest Service officer from land); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949) (specific enforcement of a contract); Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S.
731 (1947) (injunction from selling stock illegally withheld from plaintiffs and request to
have the stock returned); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) (ejectment of military
officers to recover possession of land).
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United States, an essential party, has not consented to be sued
under the circumstances of this case, the action must be dis-
missed."'
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,"' holding that
customs officers could be held personally liable for improper per-
formance of their duties. The court first considered the specific
exceptions contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2680" 9 to the general waiver
of governmental immunity, which the district court employed to
establish the inapplicability of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
While one specific exception appears to preclude suits against
customs officials, the statute must be read in pari materia with
two other statutes involving liability of customs officers. Section
2006 of 28 U.S.C. allows payment of a judgment against a cus-
toms officer out of the Treasury whenever a court certifies that
the officer was acting under proper directions or if probable cause
existed.' 2 A second statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2465, stipulates that a
customs officer shall not be liable for damages where a court
enters judgment for the return of property to a claimant if the
officer had reasonable cause for the seizure.' 2' The court con-
cluded that if all suits against customs officers were banned by
section 2680(a) & (c), as claimed by the lower court, then sections
2006 and 2465 would be unnecessary. Since these statutes re-
mained effective, the court reasoned that the exceptions set out
in section 2680 were not "meant to alter the established practice
of holding customs officers personally liable for the improper per-
formance of their duties .... ,,122
To say that because the sovereign may have to pay a judgment
rendered against certain of its officers by virtue of 28 U.S.C. §
2006, such a judgment is barred by the doctrine of sovereign
117. 359 F. Supp. at 518.
118. 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974).
119. See note 109 supra.
120. See note 112 supra.
121. 28 U.S.C. § 2465 (1970) provides:
Upon the entry of judgment for the claimant in any proceeding to condemn or
forfeit property seized under any Act of Congress, such property shall be re-
turned forthwith to the claimant or his agent; but if it appears that there was
reasonable cause for the seizure, the court shall cause a proper certificate thereof
to be entered and the claimant shall not, in such case, be entitled to costs, nor
shall the person who made the seizure, nor the prosecutor, be liable to suit or
judgment on account of such suit or prosecution.
122. 498 F.2d at 1149.
[Vol. 27
30
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss2/3
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
immunity, is in effect to say that by agreeing to pay, the sover-
eign need not do so. Thus, even assuming that a judgment
against one or more of the named defendants would be paid by
the sovereign, in order for 28 U.S.C. §§ 2006 and 2465 to be
harmonized with 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) & (c) the latter must be
construed as not affecting the long-established practice of per-
mitting suits against customs officers in their individual capaci-
ties.'?
The court also discussed the "well established exceptions" to
sovereign immunity: actions beyond statutory powers and actions
which are constitutionally void.
Having determined that customs officials could be sued in
their individual capacity, the court considered the reasonableness
of the seizure of States' cargo. States claimed that the detention
of its cargo, without institution of the prescribed forfeiture pro-
ceedings, constituted a deprivation of property without due pro-
cess of law. The Tariff Act of 1930 outlines the procedure by
which customs officers may lawfully seize goods. An agent mak-
ing a seizure must report the seizure and every violation of cus-
toms law immediately to the appropriate customs officer in his
district and turn all confiscated goods over to his superior.'24 The
official to whom the goods have been given must report the sei-
zure or violation to the United States Attorney if legal proceed-
ings are required.' 2 The United States Attorney must immedi-
ately investigate the facts surrounding the seizure and begin pro-
123. Id. at 1151.
124. 19 U.S.C. § 1602 (1970) provides:
It shall be the duty of any officer, agent or other person authorized by law to
make seizures of merchandise or baggage subject to seizure for violation of the
customs laws, to report every such seizure immediately to the appropriate cus-
toms officer for the district in which such violation occurred, and to turn over
and deliver to such customs officer any vessel, vehicle, merchandise or baggage
seized by him, and to report immediately to such customs officer every violation
of the customs laws.
125. 19 U.S.C. § 1603 (1970) states:
Whenever a seizure of merchandise for violation of the customs laws is made,
or a violation of the customs laws is discovered, and legal proceedings by the
United States attorney in connection with such seizure or discovery are required,
it shall be the duty of the appropriate customs officer to report such seizure or
violation to the United States attorney for the district in which such violation
has occurred, or in which such seizure was made, and to include in such report
a statement of all the facts and circumstances of the case within his knowledge,
with the names of the witnesses and a citation to the statute or statutes believed
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per proceedings in United States district court without delay if a
penalty or forfeiture appears probable.' 21 Where the value of
goods seized exceeds $2500, the customs officer must report the
case to the United States Attorney for the institution of proper
proceedings.'2 7 These procedures, when read in concert, clearly
evidence congressional intent that any action be taken expedi-
tiously. In United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs,'2 the
Supreme Court commented upon the failure of the enforcement
provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930 to specify a definite time
limitation:
The United States urges that we find time limits in 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1602 and 1604. Section 1602 provides that customs agents
who seize goods must "report every such seizure immediately"
to the collector of the district, while § 1604 provides that, once
a case has been turned over to a United States Attorney, it shall
be his duty to "immediately inquire into the facts" and "forth-
with to cause the proper proceedings to be commenced and
prosecuted, without delay," if he concludes judicial proceedings
are appropriate. . . . The two sections contain no specific time
limits, nor do they require the collector to act promptly in refer-
ring a matter to the United States Attorney for prosecution.
Another flaw is that § 1604 requires that, if the United States
Attorney declines to prosecute, he must report the facts to the
Secretary of the Treasury for his direction, but the Secretary is
under no duty to act with speed. The final flaw is that neither
126. 19 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970) states:
It shall be the duty of every United States attorney immediately to inquire into
the facts of cases reported to him by customs officers and the laws applicable
thereto, and if it appears probable that any fine, penalty or forfeiture has been
incurred by reason of such violation, for the recovery of which the institution of
proceedings in the United States District Court is necessary, forthwith to cause
the proper proceedings to be commenced and prosecuted, without delay, for the
recovery of such fine, penalty, or forfeiture in such case provided, unless, upon
inquiry and examination, such United States attorney decides that such pro-
ceedings cannot probably be sustained or that the ends of public justice do not
require that they be instituted or prosecuted, in which case he shall report the
facts to the Secretary of the Treasury for his direction in the premises.
127. 19 U.S.C. § 1610 (1970) provides:
If the value of any vessel, vehicle, merchandise, or baggage so seized is greater
than $2,500, the appropriate customs officer shall transmit a report of the case,
with the names of available witnesses, to the United States attorney for the
district in which the seizure was made for the institution of proper proceedings
for the condemnation of such property.
128. 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
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section requires the District Court in which a case is commenced
to come promptly to a final decision.
29
In Thirty-Seven Photographs, allegedly obscene photographs had
been seized by customs agents. Thirteen days after seizure, the
United States Attorney began forfeiture proceedings. The consti-
tutionality of the forfeiture statute13 ° was challenged on the
ground that it contained no time limit to guarantee a speedy
determination of whether the goods seized were, in fact, obscene.
The Supreme Court saved the forfeiture statute by construing it
129. Id. at 368 n.2.
130. 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1970) provides:
(a) All persons are prohibited from importing into the United States from any
foreign country any book, pamphlet, paper, writing, advertisement, circular,
print, picture, or drawing containing any matter advocating or urging treason
or insurrection against the United States, or forcible resistance to any law of the
United States, or containing any threat to take the life or inflict bodily harm
upon any person in the United States, or any obscene book, pamphlet, paper,
writing, advertisement, circular, print, picture, drawing or other representation,
figure, or image on or of paper or other material, or any cast, instrument, or
other article which is obscene or immoral, or any drug or medicine or any article
whatever for the prevention of conception or for causing unlawful abortion, or
any lottery ticket, or any printed paper that may be used as a lottery ticket, or
any advertisement of any lottery. No such articles whether imported separately
or contained in packages with other goods entitled to entry, shall be admitted
to entry; and all such articles and unless it appears to the satisfaction of the
collector that the obscene or other prohibited articles contained in the package
were inclosed therein without the knowledge or consent of the importer, owner,
agent, or consignee, the entire contents of the package in which such articles
are contained, shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture. . . . Provided further,
That the Secretary of the Treasury may, in his discretion, admit the so-called
classics or books of recognized and established literary or scientific merit, but
may in his discretion, admit such classics or books only when imported for
noncommercial purposes.
Upon the appearance of any such book or matter at any customs office, the
same shall be seized and held by the collector to await the judgment of the
district court as hereinafter provided; and no protest shall be taken to the
United States Customs Court from the decision of the collector. Upon the sei-
zure of such book or matter the collector shall transmit information thereof to
the district attorney of the district in which is situated the office at which such
seizure has taken place, who shall institute proceedings in the district court for
the forfeiture, confiscation, and destruction of the book or matter seized. Upon
the adjudication that such book or matter thus seized is of the character the
entry of which is by this section prohibited, it shall be ordered destroyed and
shall be destroyed. Upon adjudication that such book or matter thus seized is
not of the character the entry of which is by this section prohibited, it shall not
be excluded from entry under the provisions of this section.
In any such proceeding any party in interest may upon demand have the
facts at issue determined by a jury and any party may have an appeal or the
right of review as in the case of ordinary actions or suits.
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to require institution of proceedings no more than 14 days from




The circuit court recognized the virtual identity of the due
process clause of the fifth amendment and the fourteenth amend-
ment as well as the fourteenth amendment's requirement of an
evidentiary hearing.'32 The court stated that "[i]t would be in-
congruous indeed if the federal government were left completely
unrestrained under the identical wording of the fifth amendment
following the seizure of goods by customs officers."' 133 Since the
actions of the customs officials in States was not an extraordinary
situation where an outright seizure without a hearing was justi-
fied, 3 ' the court concluded:
[I]t is the considered opinion of this court that as in United
States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs. . .the statutes relative to
the disposition of plaintiffs seized property (19 U.S.C. §§ 1602,
1603, 1604) must be limited as to the time involved in their
application if they are to pass constitutional muster.'35
Relying on Sarkisian v. United States,'3' where a 9-month delay
by customs officials resulted in the failure of the government's
forfeiture proceedings, the circuit court declined to set precise
131. 402 U.S. at 373-74.
132. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405
U.S. 538 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970); Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969).
133. 498 F.2d at 1154.
134. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972).
135. 498 F.2d at 1154.
136. 472 F.2d 468 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). In Sarkisian imported
goods were seized by customs agents. Nine months passed between the completion of the
customs investigation and the institution of forfeiture proceedings by the United States
Attorney. The issue involved was whether this delay by the government was a violation
of fifth amendment rights and a failure to follow the statutory provisions of § 1603 as
properly construed. (The statute is found at note 125 supra.) Following the Supreme
Court's mode of analysis in United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, see text accompa-
nying notes 128-31 supra, the court in Sarkisian stated:
[Flor the proceedings here taken to be upheld against the owner's objections,
it was necessary for the collector to have acted with dispatch. The lapse of nine
months after completion of the investigation did not meet such a requirement,
and the Government's proceeding to forfeit must fail.
472 F.2d at 471. The court then proceeded to engraft the same time limitations of Thirty-
Seven Photographs onto § 1603. Id. at 472. It must be noted that this was a case for
recovery of the goods, and not for damages, and therefore the issue of sovereign immunity
is not raised.
34
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss2/3
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
time limits. Instead, the court indicated that the delay here in-
volved was excessive and had resulted in a constitutional depriva-
tion:
[I]n the case before us the plaintiff has presented allegations
considerably more egregious than those before the Tenth Circuit
in Sarkisian, and accordingly, there is no question but that 19
U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1603, and 1604, insofar as they require expedi-
tious administrative and judicial proceedings, have not been
complied with. Furthermore, this failure to so comply, in the
absence of explanation by defendants, amounts to a violation of
plaintiff's Fifth Amendment right not to be deprived of property
without due process of law. This being the case, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is no bar to an action against defendants in
their individual capacities. 3
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics,3 ' the Supreme Court held that a violation
of the fourth amendment right against unreasonable searches and
seizures would give rise to an action for damages against individ-
ual government officials:
The question is merely whether petitioner, if he can demon-
strate an injury consequent upon the violation by federal agents
of his Fourth Amendment rights, is entitled to redress his injury
through a particular remedial mechanism normally available in
the federal courts. "The very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection
of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." Having concluded
that petitioner's complaint states a cause of action under the
Fourth Amendment . . . we hold that petitioner is entitled to
recover money damages for any injuries he has suffered as a
result of the agents' violation of the Amendment. 9
137. 498 F.2d at 1155.
138. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens' apartment in Brooklyn was raided and searched in
the early morning hours by narcotics agents who entered without a search or arrest war-
rant. Bivens was arrested, taken to the federal courthouse, interrogated, booked, and
subjected to a strip search. Bivens later filed suit in federal district court seeking damages
for humiliation, embarrassment and mental suffering on account of the unlawful action.
The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. 276 F. Supp. 12 (E.D.
N.Y. 1967). The Second Circuit affirmed. 409 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1969). The Supreme Court
reversed. On remand, the circuit court held that agents are not immune from damage suits
for violation of constitutional rights but the defense of good faith and a reasonable belief
in the validity of, and necessity for, the search and arrest, and the manner in which they
were conducted may bar recovery of damages. 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
139. 403 U.S. at 397 (citations omitted).
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The court reasoned that the deprivation of property by its contin-
ued detention in violation of the fifth amendment was just as
repugnant to the Constitution as a fourth amendment violation:
"The necessity and appropriateness of judicial relief is no less
compelling in this case than it was in Bivens."''4
In States Marine Lines, the Fourth Circuit established its
rule that a fifth amendment violation could be vindicated by an
action for damages against the administrative official whose inac-
tion had caused the taking of property without due process of law.
The provisions governing actions of customs officials after a sei-
zure of goods were interpreted to require compliance with those
provisions within a reasonable period of time and the court indi-
cated that dilatory action would not be tolerated. The opinion
correctly concluded that the defense of sovereign immunity was
not appropriate where the claim is against officials in their indi-
vidual capacities. Moreover, damage relief was not barred where
a construction of the specific statutes involved yielded an excep-
tion to the ordinary rule. The court's decision is commendable
since it reduces the insulation of administrative officials against
justified suits for malfeasance.
140. 498 F.2d at 1157.
[Vol. 27
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